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THE LAW OF LANDLORD-TENANT: A CRITICAL
EVALUATION OF THE PAST WITH
GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE
THOMAS M. QUINN AND EARL PHILLIPS*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE purpose of this article is to explain the law of Landlord and
Tenant emphasizing its application to the leasing of residential
space within a multi-family dwelling: what it is, how it developed and
what can be done about it. It is not a very happy subject, for the law
in this area is a scandal. More often than not unjust in its preference
for the cause of the landlord, it can only be described as outrageous
when applied to the poor urban tenant in the multi-family dwelling.
There it views with complacency the most wretched living conditions,
littered and unlit hallways, stairways with steps and banisters missing,
walls and ceilings with holes, exposed wiring, broken windows, leaking
pipes, stoves and refrigerators that do not work or work only now and
then. And always the cockroaches, the rats, and the dread of the win-
ter cold and uncertain heat.
Surely the law in a civilized urban society cannot tolerate such con-
ditions. But it does! Let that be said frankly and without hedging.
Admittedly, there are building and health codes and there is a law
that governs the landlord's obligations to the tenant; but the bitter
fact is that they do not adequately protect the tenant. Indeed, there is
a savage mockery in the little tenant-oriented law that exists. Pro-
nouncements in the building and health codes and even the sometimes
harsh threat of criminal sanctions contrast painfully with the hard re-
alities of living conditions. The deteriorating conditions persist, and
grow worse. Still the landlord collects rents. That unfortunately is
the system. The trouble is not that we fail to apply properly and effec-
tively the law that is in force, but that the present law is grossly
inadequate. It is just bad law. One can understand how it developed,
but it is incomprehensible that responsible men and women who are
normally alert to intolerable social conditions in other societies can
be so blind and complacent with respect to their own shameful sys-
tem. Perhaps, they do not really know.
Understanding of landlord-tenant law is best obtained by reflecting
on what it is not. It is not similar to the law with which most people
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are familiar. This is contract or sales law. Although it is not difficult
to find instances of serious injustice in these fields, by and large, their
rules seem reasonably fair. The rights and duties of one party are re-
lated to and dependent upon those of the other. The house painter who
fails to paint does not get paid, and if he performs poorly he will
ultimately get less than the contract price, or perhaps nothing at all.
Indeed, the result may be that he pays out considerable sums to remedy
the situation he set wrong in the first place. The homeowner, in turn,
must also perform, not only by paying but also by cooperating as
required, e.g., by selecting the paint, making the premises available,
etc. There is an interrelationship and dependence here not only between
the rights and duties of the parties, but also in the remedies available
to them.
Although the lease can be viewed as a type of service contract with
the rights, obligations and remedies of the landlord and tenant related
to one another in a manner similar to the contract between the house
painter and the householder, such a view is misleading. Indeed, if one
assumes as a first principle of basic fairness that whenever two people
enter into an agreement one's performance is always interrelated and
dependent upon the other's, he will never understand landlord-tenant
law. The simple reason is that it is built on a different first premise.
The relationship between the landlord and the tenant can also pos-
sibly be viewed as similar to that which exists between a seller and a
buyer. This would furnish a familiar analogy, i.e., the marketplace.
Thus, it is possible to think of the landlord as leasing an apartment
the way one thinks of Hertz or Avis renting a car.
However sensible this approach, it is also incorrect. In the vendor-
vendee situation not only are the rights and obligations of the parties
related and mutually dependent, but there is also a long tradition of
imposing definite quality standards on those who market goods. This
tradition, however, is foreign to the marketing of apartments.
If the more familiar legal analogies fail, where are we to go? The only
course left is to approach the subject as one approaches a foreign
country. One must leave behind one's preconceived notions as to how
the law operates, suspend one's sense of basic fairness since this can
distort the picture as well, and be prepared to accept this area for what
it is, i.e., foreign country, different and sufficient unto itself. Thus,
what the stranger to landlord-tenant law finds novel and singularly be-
wildering, the seasoned practitioner in landlord-tenant law accepts as
commonplace.
In order to understand landlord-tenant law one must forget the
modern urban complex with its towering office buildings, its sprawl
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of huge apartments, and its teeming slums. The place to start is with
the countryside, i.e., the grass, trees, and grazing sheep. We are back
to the land now, and land is really what landlord-tenant law is still all
about. That may seem curious to the man who gets off the elevator
fifteen stories up in the air to go to an apartment where even a
dandelion could not grow, but such is the fact. The land is the thing.
It is the fields, orchards, pastures and streams and their possession and
use that are important. To comprehend the law it is helpful to envision
the tenant leaning on a fence at twilight, watching his fields and awaiting
the call to dinner. It is against this simple background that landlord and
tenant law took the shape it has essentially retained to this day.
With this background as a starting point, the crudities and eccen-
tricities of landlord-tenant law become at least understandable. Still
more important, it focuses our attention on not only where things
started to go wrong in this body of law but also on the reason why.
II. LANDLORD-TENANT OBLIGATIONS: PART I
The landlord's primary obligation was to turn over possession' of
the land to the tenant and to agree to leave him in peaceful possession.2
1. In technical terms the landlord conveys a leasehold estate which gives the tenant the
legal right to possession. This has had interesting consequences in some jurisdictions where it
has been held that the landlord has fully performed his obligation if the lease gives the
tenant the legal right to possession at the beginning of the term. No obligation, however,
is imposed on the landlord to see that the tenant actually gets into possession, eg., by
evicting a holdover tenant. Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1842); Hannan
v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). In other jurisdictions there is an implied covenant
by the landlord that the premises shall be open when the time for possession arrives. Canaday
v. Krueger, 156 Neb. 287, 56 N.W.2d 123 (1952) (Tenant prevented from taking po-session
by landlord's failure to complete construction of building on premises) ; Adrian v. Rabino-
witz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Barfield v. Damon, 56 N.11. 515, 245 P.2d
1032 (1952) (Tenant prevented from taking possession by a holdover). The cases are col-
lected in Annot., 70 A.L.R. 151 (1931).
The New York common law has been changed by statute. "In the absence of an express
provision to the contrary, there shall be implied in every lease of real property a condition
that the lessor will deliver possession at the beginning of the term." N.Y. Real Prop. Law
§ 223-a (1968).
This distinction between actual possession and the mere right to possession also surfaces
where the tenant voluntarily vacates the leased premises. The tenant remains liable for the
rent absent a constructive eviction since he retains the legal right to possession for which
rent is the payment although he is not actually occupying the premises. See Enoch C. Rich-
ards Co. v. Libby, 136 Me. 376, 10 A.2d 609 (1940); Lane v. Nelson, 167 Pa. 602, 31 A.
864 (1895); Barlow v. Wainwright, 22 Vt. 88 (1849). See also Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass.
450, 15 N.E2d 476 (1938).
2. This does not mean that the landlord has an affirmative duty to maintain and pro-
tect the tenant's use and possession. Quite the contrary. His duty is negative, i.e., to refrain
from disturbing the tenant's possession and use. Therefore, a landlord cannot be held respon-
19691
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The tenant, in turn, was expected to pay the "rent."3 In technical
terms, the tenant "covenanted" to pay the rent while the landlord
"covenanted" to keep him in quiet possession.
Significantly, the landlord was not being paid to do anything. He
was turning over the land to the tenant with the rent serving as con-
tinuous compensation for the transfer. The landlord was not expected
to assist in the operation of the land. Quite the reverse, he was ex-
pected to stay as far away as possible. In other words, for the term
of the lease, the lands were subject to the tenant's, not the landlord's
care and concern. Should the landlord interfere, he risked violating
real property law.
A landlord's or tenant's failure to perform his basic obligation led
to the problem of remedies in landlord-tenant law. Once again even a
rudimentary knowledge of remedies as they are found in other areas of
the law, for example, in the law of sales, can cause great confusion
and consternation here. One expects to find in any advanced legal
system a certain sophistication where remedies will be measured at
least roughly to meet the needs that gave rise to their use. However
legitimate the expectation, it does not come to fruition in landlord-
tenant law. Remedies, like everything else in this field, are based upon
a single notion, i.e., the possession-rent relationship.
Rent was the quid pro quo for possession. If the tenant failed to
pay the rent, he would be deprived of possession.4 The landlord, once
sible for an unauthorized interference with the tenant's use by a third person who does not
have a title paramount to that of the landlord. Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264
(1927).
3. Technically, rent was the consideration furnished by the tenant for the leasehold
estate, i.e., for the tenant's legal right to possession and use undisturbed by the landlord.
Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 fI1. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930). See
Coogan v. Parker, 2 S.C. 255 (1870).
4. The lease was viewed as a conveyance of an estate by the landlord to the tenant.
Originally, the tenant's promise to pay the rent was a separate covenant made by the
tenant and independent of the conveyance made by the landlord. As a result, a default in
the rental payment was indeed a breach of covenant but it did not give the landlord a right
to oust the tenant from the premises. Brown v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); De Lancey v.
Ganong, 9 N.Y. 9 (1853). The landlord's only remedies consisted of a power to sue for tile
rent as it accrued coupled with a power to distrain the tenant's chattels as a way of further
pressuring payment. The landlord's response was to draft the lease so as to avoid this im-
passe. Hence a clause was inserted in the lease which reserved to the landlord power to
terminate the lease for nonpayment of the rent. The process came to fruition with the
passage of statutes providing the landlord with not only a procedure for evicting the tenant
for default of the rent but also the power to evict by summary procedures. E.g., N.Y. Real
Prop. Actions Law § 711 (1963). Interestingly enough, the modern statutes give the land-
lord the power of summary eviction for nonpayment even though the lease contains no
clause reserving the power to terminate for nonpayment of rent. The net result of the pro-
1969] LANDLORD-TENANT
he had conveyed the leasehold, was obliged to leave the tenant in quiet
possession of the premises. Where the landlord failed in this basic
possessory obligation by actually interfering with the tenant's posses-
sion, the tenant's one effective remedy was to "interfere" with the rent
which stood as the surrogate for possession.'
The crudest form of violation of the tenant's right to possession
occurred when the landlord entered the land prior to the expiration of
the lease and forcefully removed the tenant. As a result of this intrusion,
the law abated the rent completely, and even permitted the tenant to
sue for his injuries.6 The point, of course, was that rent stood for pos-
session, and since possession was gone, so was the obligation to pay
the rent. Further, if the tenant wanted to recover the actual possession
of the premises, that too was possible by an action in ejectment.'
cess was to make the tenant's right to possession and enjoyment of the premises so depen-
dent on the payment of rent that summary procedures were readily available to assure that
either the tenant paid the rent or was evicted.
5. Inherent in the conveyance of a possessory estate for a term was the duty of the land-
lord to leave the tenant in possession for the term of the lease without interference. It
was in return for this estate and the continuing right to quietly possess the land that the
tenant covenanted to pay the rent. This inherent duty of the landlord was imposed by the
law through the device of an implied covenant. Thus, every lease contained by implication,
if not expressly, the landlord's covenant not to oust the tenant from possession of the
demised premises or any part thereof during the term of the lease. Thurman v. Trim, 199
Kan. 679, 433 P.2d 367 (1967); L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tem. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286
(1950). The cases are collected in Annots., 62 A.L.R. 1257, 1258-66 (1929), and 41 A.L.R2d
1414, 1420-23 (1955). Since undisturbed possession of the land for the term of the lease was
the consideration for the rent, the law viewed the landlord's interference with the tenant's
possession, for example, by forcing the tenant off the land, as a failure of consideration. The
tenant's rental obligation was then abated because of a failure of consideration. When the
landlord ousted the tenant, the rental obligation was suspended until the tenant regained
possession of the entire premises. 18 Halsbury, Laws of England § 959, at 479 (1911).
6. Although covenants in a lease were viewed as independent, the obligation to pay rent
was in fact dependent upon the landlord's observance of his duty not to interfere with the
tenant's possession. True, the breach of the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment did not,
as such, release the tenant from his covenant to pay rent because property law held that
covenants in a lease were independent. However, when the tenant was deprived of possession,
there was truly a failure of consideration for the rent. Royce v. Guggenheim, 106 Mass. 201
(1870); Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917). Thus
the duty to pay rent was either suspended while the tenant was dispossessed, Christopher v.
Austin, 11 N.Y. 216 (1854) (partial eviction), or, should the tenant give up his estate,
terminated completely, Gans v. L. Olhin, Inc., 109 Conn. 164, 145 A. 751 (1929). In addition,
the tenant was given the usual remedy for breach of covenant, an action for damages. In re
O'Donnell, 240 N.Y. 99, 147 N.E. 541 (1925); Scriver v. Smith, 100 N.Y. 471, 3 N.E. 675
(1885).
7. By the year 1500, the English courts recognized that a lessee could recover not only
damages but also the land itself in an action in ejectment. 3 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 216 (3d ed. 1927). Though originally designed to protect only a lessee from un-
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Once possession was recovered the rent obligation was reinstated. The
law's chief concern, therefore, was with correcting in one way or another
any imbalances in this basic possession-rent relationship.
This preoccupation with the possession-rent relationship, however,
was carried to extremes. Concededly, no theoretical problem arose where
the landlord physically evicted the tenant. In this case the abused tenant
certainly had no actual possession of the premises. The disequilibrium
in the relationship was clear. However, suppose the tenant had not been
physically evicted, but rather was subjected to such harassment and
vexation that life on the premises became a misery. This situation pre-
sented a serious problem with regard to the tenant's remedy. The
landlord was certainly not performing. Indeed, let us assume that he
was flagrantly interfering with his tenant's "quiet enjoyment" of the
premises. Was the tenant free to stop paying the rent since his use
and enjoyment had been clearly diminished? The answer was no.
There were two reasons for this strange but entirely consistent re-
sult. First, the landlord had not physically interfered with the tenant's
actual hold on the premises. He had stopped short of physical eviction.
Second, and infinitely more important, was the evident fact that the
tenant still retained possession. As a result, although under stress, the
fundamental possession-rent relationship remained in balance. The tenant
was still holding onto the full leasehold, and thus, the landlord retained
his right to the full rent. The rent was the surrogate for possession.
Suppose the tenant abandoned the premises? The possession-rent
relationship certainly appeared to be in disequilibrium. Did the land-
lord still retain his right to the rent? The ancient answer is yes.8
The point that emerges and which bears emphasis is that the basic
remedies peculiar to landlord-tenant law are possession oriented. The
tenant who failed to pay the rent was evicted from possession. In turn,
the landlord violated the law when he deprived the tenant of possession.
These measures are still the law. However, it is the contemporary
man who experiences the sense of shock and not the ancient farmer.
Historically, the land was the thing and its possession the whole story,
more than the fabled nine-tenths of the law. It yielded grain from the
fields, fruit from the orchard, water from the stream, and heat from
the woods. So long as the tenant remained in possession equilibrium was
maintained. He had his part of the agreement, and so long as he clung
to possession, and quite literally reaped the fruits of possession, he was
lawful ejectment, the action subsequently became the one whereby questions of title to the
freehold were settled. 7 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 10 (1926).
8. See generally note 20 infra.
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obliged to render to the landlord the law's substitute for possession, i.e.,
the rent.
III. LANDLOP-TENANT OBLIGATIONS: PART II
It all made sense back in those days with the landlord off on the
hunt or drinking port in the quiet of the evening, and the tenant asking
only to be left alone to tend his fences and to shear his sheep. The
heart of the system was land and its possession. The model landlord
was the one who did the least. The tenant, in turn, was expected to
run the farm, to be the omnicompetent man fully prepared to see to
his own shelter, heat and light.
Get away from the simplicities of the rural scene, however, and the
old ideas get strangely and radically out of joint. What once made sense,
now looks more like nonsense.
The scene shifts from the countryside to the city, and the subject
is not land but space in a building. In place of the farmer leaning on
his fence at twilight there is now a clerk, newspaper under his arm,
climbing the stairs to reach his flat on the second floor. The farm
acreage gives way to square feet of board floor enclosed by walls and
ceiling. Of course, this is to be the pattern of the future which will
culminate in buildings so high that an internal transportation system
will be necessary.
How did the landlord-tenant law, developed for the farm, function
when applied to the apartment in the multi-family dwelling? Well
enough, at least on the surface. The basics were still there, important
and workable. The landlord's job was still to turn over possession and
then to assure the tenant that he would not be disturbed in his tenure.
The tenant, in turn, was bound to make his rental payments.
The trouble, of course, was that once you scratched below the sur-
face even the basics began to fall apart. The tenant in the multi-family
dwelling was not an independent farmer. He did not share the farmer's
interest in being left alone to work the fields. Indeed, there were no
fields. The object of the lease was now a building, or more accurately,
a part of a building, i.e., the flat. The new type of tenant was anything
but self-sufficient and the last thing he wanted was to be left alone.
Since he occupied only a part of a building, he was dependent on the
rest of it,. He relied upon the building's water system, lighting system,
and heating system; he was sharing walls, doors, corridors and stairways.
Agrarian self-reliance in this context is simply not possible. Indeed,
if the hypothetical farmer were somehow transposed to the flat and
there attempted to be self-sufficient, he would be physically thwarted at
1969]
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every turn. The law itself would impede and threaten him with the
risk of serious liability were he to make the effort.
Just as the real property law served the agrarian tenant, it worked
against the tenant in the multi-family unit. True, he had possession of
part of the building and the older law assured him of his quiet posses-
sion in his assigned area, but the rest of the building was not only
owned by someone else, but also was possessed by others whose quiet
possession was also protected by the law. Consequently, he could no
longer assure warmth in his dwelling, for doing so involved entering areas
outside the leasehold and tampering with another man's boiler. His
own "quiet possession" in this context assured him the undisputed
possession of a cold apartment that he could not heat even if he were
prepared to spend the time, the effort, and the money.
Clearly, the ancient landlord-tenant idea of the lease is woefully out
of line with the changed physical circumstances. Possession, even pos-
session of apartment space, is no longer the whole story. Possession is
only part of the agreement. Indeed, it may not even be the prime com-
ponent. Just a very short stay in an apartment without heat or light,
with broken plumbing and rodent infestation is all that is needed to
make this point painfully clear. A roof and a floor are admittedly im-
portant, but hardly the only aspect to the renting of an apartment.
Surely the landlord assumed added obligations more consonant with
the changed situation. Who else could supply the needed services? He
did, of course.
Or did he? On the surface he certainly did. This type of obligation is
commonplace even in the form lease; at least some of the standard
clauses, e.g., heat and water9 have been included for a long time. But even
these, unfortunately, come accompanied by a variety of waivers and dis-
claimers. The crucial question, however, is not whether the landlord has
a stated obligation to render services, but rather what can be done about
9. E.g., The Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., Standard Form of Apartment Lease,
clause 13 provides: "As long as Tenant is not in default under any of the provisions of this
lease Landlord covenants to furnish, insofar as the existing facilities provide, the following
services: (a) Elevator service; (b) Hot and cold water in reasonable quantities at all times;
(c) Heat at reasonable hours during the cold seasons of the year."
In addition to the obligations which the landlord assumes by covenant in the lease, there
are those imposed upon him by statutes, local building codes, and municipal ordinances.
For instance, where applicable, the N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law requires the ownprs of most
apartment buildings to supply hot and cold water to every apartment, § 75 (Supp. 1969) ; to
keep the apartments in good repair, § 78 (1946); to provide heat, § 79 (Supp. 1969); and
to light and ventilate public halls and stairs within the building, § 217 (1946). The tenant
may recover in tort for damages caused by the landlord's failure to keep the tenant's apart-
ment in good repair. Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
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his failure to do so. It is here that one of the more bizarre features of
landlord-tenant law surfaces.
One would have anticipated a give and take between landlord and
tenant in this area. The landlord's failure to supply heat would justify
the tenant in withholding rent or reducing it somewhat to cover the
costs of his own attempts at interim heating. The prospect of a tenant's
being forced to continue paying rent under pain of summary eviction
when heat is not supplied seems preposterous to one who expects basic
fairness from the law. However, this is exactly how the law of landlord-
tenant operates. 10 The reason for this legal monstrosity lies in the in-
ability of the courts to adjust the old law satisfactorily to the new
circumstances. There had to be adjustments where the landlord had
assumed new obligations beyond the mere assurance of quiet possession.
The only question was what adjustments.
What the law did was to preserve the old landlord-tenant law with
its fixation on possession as the crux of the lease, and with rent as the
quid pro quo for possession. Onto this was engrafted a new set of
rights and duties (concerning heat, hot water and repairs) which were
independent of the possession-rent relationship and considered incidental
and unimportant relative to possession." The result was a double set of
relationships between the landlord and the tenant, i.e., a two level re-
lationship.
On level one, the basic level, whether the tenant happened to be a
farmer or a dweller in a multi-family unit was quite immaterial. He
was first and foremost a tenant, and that meant he was entitled to pos-
session, whether it happened to be land or space in a building. He was
assured of quiet possession, and in return was bound to pay the full
rent under pain of eviction.
On level two, the newer and less important level legally, he had a
right to heat, light and other services from the landlord. Level two
10. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 IlI. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930);
Barone Bldg., Inc. v. Mahoney, 16 La. App. 84, 132 So. 795 (1931). Also, the landlord's
breach of his statutory obligation to make repairs, etc., does not permit the tenant to with-
hold rent.
11. Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 111 So. 10 (1926). (Since the landlord's covenant to
repair is independent of the tenant's covenant to pay rent, the breach of the covenant to
repair is no bar to an action for rent accruing while the tenant continues in poession);
Wurz v. Watts, 73 Misc. 262, 132 N.Y.S. 685 (Oneida County Ct. 1911) ; Graham Hotel Co.
v. Garrett, 33 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (Because of the landlord's breach of the
covenant to supply heat and hot water, the tenant can recover damages to the extent of his
loss of profits. However, the tenant must pay the rent accruing while he remained in pos-
session, landlord's breach of covenant notwithstanding.).
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constituted a separate agreement. The landlord was expected to perform
and if he did not the tenant was free to sue him for redress.
Significantly, the two levels were separate and distinct. A failure to
perform on one level generated a remedy on that level, but in no way
affected the other level. In technical terms, the covenants on one level
were not reciprocal with the covenants on the other.12 What it actually
meant was that the tenant had to pay the full rent so long as he had
possession of the premises (level one), even though the landlord failed
miserably in the delivery of services (level two). 13 The sophisticated
legal structure was a velvet glove which concealed an iron fist.
Theoretically, the tenant was free to go into court to seek redress for
the breached service contract, 4 but the route was so cumbersome, time
consuming and costly that it was neither practical nor realistic. More-
over, it meant that even when the tenant went into court, he did so in
a cold apartment with small pressure on the dilatory landlord. Stopping
the rent was language the landlord was likely to understand, but this
was not available.' 5 The tenant, who assumed that basic fairness per-
mitted him to operate on a "no heat, no rent" basis, was in trouble. The
tenant was here confusing the two levels, attempting to apply level
one remedies to level two problems. On level one the tenant was bound
to pay the rent so long as he was assured possession. In addition, the
landlord was fulfilling his obligation by assuring the tenant quiet pos-
session. By withholding the rent, however, the tenant was violating his
part of the level one relationship. He had possession and full rent was
due. His refusal to pay the rent, therefore, was without legal justifica-
tion. He was the wrongdoer.' 6 In addition, the landlord had every right
to apply his basic level one remedy, i.e., eviction of the tenant from
the premises. The result was a legal proceeding where only two ques-
tions were asked: (1) Are you in the apartment? (2) Did you pay the
rent? Everything else, the heat, the garbage, the plumbing, was techni-
12. Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914) (The cov-
enant to pay rent is independent of the landlord's covenant to maintain the basement of the
premises in a waterproof condition. Hence, the landlord's breach of this covenant is no
defense to an action for rent.)
13. See Reaume v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 299 Mich. 305, 300 N.W. 97 (1941); Peters v.
Kelly, 98 NJ. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam); Edgerton v. Page,
20 N.Y. 281 (1859); Waldorf Sys., Inc. v. Dawson, 49 R.I. 57, 139 A. 789 (1928).
14. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Durant Land Improvement Co., 144 N.Y. 34, 39
N.E. 7 (1894).
15. Wurz v. Watts, 73 Misc. 262, 132 N.Y.S. 685 (Oneida County Ct. 1911). See cases
cited note 13 supra.
16. See Reaume v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 299 Mich. 305, 300 N.W. 97 (1941).
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cally quite irrelevant. It is unfortunate that this sort of vicious legal
in-fighting should be sanctioned by the law.
More startling still was the plight of the tenant who simply abandoned
the apartment. The service in the apartment had been defective and
he had a right to complain. Indeed, he had a legal right to redress of
his grievances. But that right existed on level two. Abandoning the
apartment was level one action. He had contracted for possession, pos-
session had been given, it had not been interfered with and thus, he
had a rental obligation. If he chose to leave that was his business, but
his duty to pay the rent continued for the term of the lease." The fact
that there was no heat in the apartment had nothing to do with the
possession-rent relationship of level one. After all, covenants were not
reciprocal.:'
Only when living conditions became unbearable did the law inter-
cede. It did so by stretching the old idea of the landlord's physical evic-
tion of the tenant to fit the new situation. This was the doctrine of the
"constructive" eviction. Here, the landlord had not actually removed the
tenant from the prenises, but he had certainly harassed the tenant to
such an extent that leaving the premises became the only feasible alterna-
tive.19 The legal question was whether this type of situation should be
equated with a physical eviction and treated the same way? The answer
was yes.
20
The revealing point is that the law was unwilling to classify the
harassment alone as an act equivalent to an eviction. It was insistent
that the tenant actually abandon the premises before the doctrine
17. Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A. 392 (CL Err. & App. 1914).
18. Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mlass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938). As previously noted, the
lease was considered as fundamentally a conveyance to the tenant of a right to possession
for a term. Once the conveyance was made, and the tenant had acquired a legal right to
possession for an agreed period, the main thing had been accomplished. Except for the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, therefore, the covenants in a lease were viewed as incidental
and relatively unimportant when compared with the conveyance to the tenant of his estate,
i.e., his right to possession. 1 American Law of Property § 3.11 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
Consequently, a subsequent breach by either party of the promises incidentally inserted in
the lease was considered immaterial and, therefore, gave the aggrieved party no right to
rescind the conveyance or terminate the estate conveyed. Moreover, it did not excuse the
injured party from the performance of his covenants. E.g., Ravkind v. Jones Apothecary,
Inc., 439 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
19. E.g., Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959)
(Landlord's failure, in breach of the lease, to furnish light, heat, electrical power and ele-
vator service to a fifth floor tenant was breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment.).
20. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1826). The text refers, of course, to
the now traditional "constructive eviction with abandonment" doctrine in its modern urban
context. For a discussion of this doctrine see 1 American Law of Property § 3.51 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952).
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could be invoked. The doctrine was not so much one of "constructive"
eviction as it was one of "constructive" eviction with abandonment. The
abandonment was the critical element that placed the case into the cat-
egory of an "eviction." The reason was that the abandonment affected the
possession component of the possession-rent relationship, placing it in
disequlibrium. Granted, it had been caused by the voluntary act of the
tenant, but the landlord was ultimately responsible for the decision to
leave. Given this actual abandonment, an analogy exists between the true
eviction and "constructive" eviction. In both the result was the same.
Possession had been taken from the tenant, in one case by crude force,
i.e., the true eviction, in the other by indirect measures, i.e., the "con-
structive" eviction. Where the harassment was not accompanied by an
abandonment of the premises, it was not treated as an eviction. The
tenant could not abate the rent, but rather had to pay in full while he
remained in possession of the uninhabitable premises.
This appeared very traditional. The law was not talking about the
landlord's failure to supply services, but rather of his obligation to
assure quiet possession. That was the old idea, and that was what
triggered the old remedy, i.e., the tenant's power to abate the rent by
leaving the premises. Beneath the traditional exterior, however, a radically
new idea was really at work. What the law was doing was taking an
obligation that clearly situated itself on level two, i.e., the landlord's ser-
vice obligation, and shifting it down to level one. On this level, there
was a relationship of dependence between it and the rent. Here a failure
to supply service, at least a gross failure to supply service, did affect
the rental obligation. What the law was accomplishing, therefore, was
the fusion of the two levels in the limited situation where the failure
to provide services was so severe that it shocked the court's conscience.
Although the effort was praiseworthy, it contained a radical defect.
It was a possession-oriented remedy. Harassment of the tenant worked
a rental abatement only when the tenant actually abandoned the premises.
But if he chose to remain and use the land, the full rent was due. For the
tenant in the multi-family dwelling, this meant that the tenant was free
to abandon the premises where the failure of service was extreme, but
had to pay the full rent so long as he stayed. 1
The remedy's value became even more ephemeral in the modern
context of a housing shortage. Assuming gross abuse of the service
obligation by the landlord, abandonment by the tenant may not be a
very real option. All too familiar in the urban ghetto is the family in
an apartment with peeling plaster, broken windows, random heat,
21. Herstein Co. v. Columbia Picture Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 117, 149 N.E.2d 328, 172 N.Y.S.2d
808 (1958).
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faulty plumbing and appliances, and rats. The family can leave and be
rid of the rent obligation, but where are conditions any better, and if
the same situation develops there, as it normally does, what are they
to do? So they usually stay and the full rent remains due. If it is not
paid they are subject to eviction, defective services and poor living con-
ditions notwithstanding.
This final horror led to still another quite recent attempt to find a
remedy within the creaky system. This was the development of the
theory of "constructive eviction without abandonment."22 Here lawyers
were attempting not merely to stretch the old law, but to develop a
radically new idea under the guise of a recognized and accepted legal
doctrine. The starting point was the "constructive eviction with
abandonment." Why not continue classifying the gross failure of ser-
vices as a constructive eviction and permit the tenant to abate the rent
without abandoning the premises?2 As a matter of simple justice, to do
so makes eminently good sense. What blocked this most sensible de-
velopment was the old landlord-tenant law's inability to relinquish the
hoary possession-rent correlation. What had made the "constructive"
eviction an "eviction" was the fact that the premises were actually
abandoned by the tenant. The crux was not so much the failure of
services as it was the actual abandonment. The law equated the situation
with a crude physical eviction. Moreover, the crucial rental abatement
did not depend on the harassment by the landlord, but on the fact
that the harassment resulted in the actual abandonment of the premises.
Possession had been surrendered and this affected the rent. The old
possession-rent relationship, therefore, was in disequilibrium because of
the landlord's misconduct. This justified the abatement of the rent.
22. See generally Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change,
54 Geo. LJ. 519, 529-31 (1966).
23. It is also possible to view a failure of services as a constructive partial eviction.
Therefore, although the tenant remains in possession of the "incomplete" premises, he may
refuse to pay rent without fear of eviction until the landlord's wrong is corrected. Bored v.
Lawton, 90 N.Y. 293 (1882); Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 31 App.
Div. 2d 342, 298 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1969) (A breach of a covenant to provide air-
conditioning in evenings and on weekends so that the tenant's office could remain open
during those times constituted a partial eviction which relieved the tenant of his obligation to
pay rent while the breach continued. This was true even though the tenant had not aban-
doned the premises.); Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. T.),
rev'g 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
On suspension of the rent in the case of an actual partial eviction, see Fifth Ave. Bldg.
Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917); Edgerton v. Page, 20 N.Y. 281
(1859); Christopher v. Austin, 11 N.Y. 216 (1854); Two Rector St. Corp. v. Bein, 226
App. Div. 73, 234 N.Y.S. 409 (1st Dep't 1929); Kusche v. Sabin, 6 N.Y.S2d 771 (New
Rochelle City Ct. 1938).
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Where there was no abandonment by the tenant it was hard to see
how there could be talk of an "eviction" constructive or otherwise. After
all, the tenant was still in possession."4
As previously noted, what the "constructive eviction without abandon-
ment" doctrine was attempting to do was to permit an abatement of
the rent even though the tenant remained fully in possession." This
was a radically new idea and had it succeeded it would have linked
the rental obligation not just to possession, as was traditional, but to a
failure to provide service. In effect, the landlord's covenant to render
service would now be reciprocal with the tenant's rental obligation, at
least where the failure of service was so gross as to be classifiable as a
"constructive" eviction. Beneath the jargon was a direct attack against
the two level system.
A number of courts have approved the doctrine, 2  but unfortunately
it has not yet been widely accepted.2 7 Perhaps it is simply too sophisti-
cated a fiction, however sensible its intentions, to bridge the gap between
the two levels upon which landlord-tenant law operates. If it had been
fully accepted, landlord-tenant law would have been developed to the
point where the tenant's rental obligation was dependent upon the land-
lord's performance of his service function as well as upon the fulfillment
of the covenant of quiet enjoyment 28
However, the old law was maintained. The landlord's routine failure
to perform his service obligation is, therefore, as a practical matter,
without remedy. Gross failures may be remedied in some extreme cases
by abandonment of the premises. Short of this the tenant must continue
to pay the rent whether he stays or leaves.
24. Edgerton v. Page, 20 N.Y. 281 (1859).
25. The suspension of the tenant's obligation to pay rent even while he is in possession
would not be unjust were the landlord permitted to recover the reasonable value of the use
of the premises in their defective condition. This was done in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), a case of breach of warranty of habitability.
26. See Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 342, 298
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1969); Robb v. Cinema Francais, Inc., 194 Misc. 987, 88 N.YS.2d
380 (Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.YC.
Mun. Ct. 1950); Majen Realty Corp. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1946).
27. See Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. T.) (per curlam),
rev'g 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Civ. Ct. 1964).
28. As with other fictions which permit the development of the law without a radical
dislocation of traditional modes of thought, the cumbersome "constructive eviction without
abandonment" device could have been later dropped and, in the interest of clarity and
realism, its underlying purpose frankly acknowledged, i.e., that covenants in a lease are
actually reciprocal. Indeed, the way would have been open to carry the realism a step
further by expressly noting that the two level relationship that previously structured land-
lord-tenant relationships in the law was no longer so evident a fact,
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With the law of landlord-tenant so radically out of balance in favor
of the landlord, the consequence was predictable. In ghetto areas, de-
teriorating structures, rat infestation, and health and fire hazards are
widespread. Surely this could not be tolerated by civilized men and
women. It was not, of course. A variety of legislative efforts designed
to correct the situation were made. The private law had failed to develop
a clear set of really enforceable service obligations between the landlord
and his tenant. Legislatures, therefore, imposed on the landlord civic
obligations which the landlord would now owe to the community at
large. These obligations were imposed on the landlord in the form of
building and health codes.2 9
IV. LANDLORD-TENANT OBLIGATIONS: PART III
A. Criminal Sanctions
The usual way to force a citizen to observe higher standards of con-
duct is by the use of criminal sanctions.30 With the sanction threatening,
presumably the one threatened will do his civic duty. Should he fall,
the pain of fines and prison walls stand ready to instruct him in the
error of his ways.
Criminal law designed to coerce landlords into the maintenance of
decent building and health standards have an ancient tradition.3 Their
value in the context of the modern urban setting, however, is question-
able at best. Although there are laws designed to eliminate substandard
living conditions, these conditions still prevail. There exists a frightful
gap between the high promises of the building and health codes on the
one hand, and the hard reality of dreadful living conditions on the
other.
Enacting laws is one thing; translating them into action is another
and quite different thing. The criminal law on its most superficial level
is merely words on paper. The reality of enforcement is that the inter-
dicted activity must be identified, and a case must be assembled, pre-
pared, and presented to the trier of fact. Manageable things, such as
physical conditions and. actions, along with not so manageable things
like subjective intentions and a criminal state of mind must be proven.
It takes time and effort; a lot of people and money are needed. There are
29. Housing codes designed to protect tenants, as opposed to regulations intended to
protect the public from fire and building collapse, were first enacted at the beginning of this
century. Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 Colum.
L. Rev. 1254, 1259 (1966).
30. See generally Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 304, 314-23 (1965).
31. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 29, at 1262-63.
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only so many policemen, public prosecutors and judges. Consequently,
there has to be a screening process. It is only the extreme violation that
has any chance of being remedied in the major city setting, where large
numbers of old buildings are deteriorating rapidly. The present costs of
municipal government are extremely high, taxable revenues always insuf-
ficient, and the demands on the criminal enforcement system intense.
Even when the case does move through the system to court action, there
is still the human element, a variable that is difficult to define, but no less
real. For example, there is the problem of the imposition of a penalty at
the conclusion of a successful trial. Shall the court impose a fine or send
the landlord to prison, and how much of a fine, or how many days in jail
are there to be? These are hard questions to answer, but ones that will
have a profound affect on whether tenants sue landlords. Sending land-
lords to prison is not very popular.32 Even in New York, a major housing
area with countless structures in fearsome disrepair and more than its
share of professional slumlords, a prison sentence in a housing case is rare
indeed.3" The fine is the usual remedy, and if the experience in New York
is any indication of its effectiveness, it is simply not significant. The
average fine per case in New York City has been variously estimated as
$14"4 and $16.1 What does it all amount to when the law has run its
course and the fine imposed? Very little indeed, and honesty compels a
frank admission of that fact.
For the knowledgeable landlord, the whole process is simply a matter
of risks and basic economics. How likely is it that the law will penalize
him and how long will it take the law to get around to doing so, if it does
so at all? If the landlord is threatened with suit what are the options
available to him to smooth things out along the way, e.g., a start at some
repairs? If the matter actually terminates in conviction and a fine, how
does the cost of the fine compare with the cost of maintaining the build-
ing properly or even rectifying the complained of conditions?" At the
32. Id. at 1279-81.
33. In New York City in 1963 only 36 out of 14,786 landlords convicted of housing
code violations were imprisoned. Id. at 1277 n.102. The District of Columbia's record Is
even better. Through 1965 no landlord had ever been sent to jail for a housing code viola-
tion. P. Wald, Law and Poverty 1965 15 (1965).
34. Gribetz and Grad, supra note 29, at 1276.
"In many states, the fines levied for housing code violations are so small that they may
properly be considered as establishing a system of licensing rather than as constituting an
effective deterrent." Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property,
66 Colum. L. Rev. 275, 278 (1966).
35. P. Wald, supra note 33, at 15.
36. In one case a fine of $50 was imposed for violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law
and New York City's Administrative Code. The correction of the violation would have cost
$42,500. Even so, the court of appeals might have reversed the conviction because the land-
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base of the process lie these economic questions. Actually, it is far
cheaper to pay the fine than to make the repairs, much less maintain
the building in a habitable condition. What about the opprobrium of a
conviction? That carries about the same sting as a traffic ticket.
Although this recital is discouraging, it is not the entire story, since
all that has been considered is the handling of the housing offense after
it has come to the attention of the criminal enforcement system. That
is the tail end of a process, not the beginning. Before the case gets there
it must work its way through several different bureaucracies. With the
housing and health codes come departments of buildings, health, gas,
water and electricity, sanitation and fire, etc. This generates yet another
and a different set of problems. The first is the problem of jurisdiction.
What department is charged with remedying the particular complaint?
Since serious complaints come in clusters, what departments are to be
contacted, and how do they relate to one another? In the modern city
the answer to a jurisdictional question requires a knowledgeable hous-
ing expert. The inexperienced may wander for days, weeks or months
just looking for the right place to go."
After finding the right department, the second problem is the awe-
some one of getting that department's machinery into operation to
serve the complaining tenant. Here again the tenant is faced with a
self-contained bureaucratic system. It is burdened with waiting lists,
heavy daily work loads, too few inspectors, too few substitutes, intense
paperwork levels, and on top of all that, other equally important work
to do, e.g., fighting fire, repairing water mains, etc. Once again com-
plaints must be screened in order to handle the graver violation. Policies
of adjustment are adopted in the hope of reducing costs and caseloads.
Moreover, before the case is even suggested for prosecution, decisions
on higher levels must be made. This leads to further delays.
The process is slow, to say the least. When and if all the wheels get
lord did not have the money to correct the violations and could not procure a loan. People
v. Rowen, 9 N.Y.2d 732, 174 N.E.2d 331, 214 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1961), rev'g 11 App. Div. 2d
670, 204 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1st Dep't 1960).
37. A housing complaint's guide for New York City clearly demonstrates the maze
through which a citizen must wander when looking for help. In 1964, no water in an entire
building was a matter for the New York City Department of Health; no cold water in one
apartment, no hot water in one apartment and insufficient water were matters for the
Department of Buildings. Leaking pipes, sinks, and radiators were also for the Department
of Buildings. If the leak was a large one, however, wasting a lot of water, the Department
of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity had jurisdiction. Leaking toilets were under the juris-
diction of both the Buildings Department and the Health Department. An overflow of water
from the apartment above was a Police Department matter. WMICA: Call For Action,
Housing Complaints Guide: The Book you SHOULDN'T Need 3 (1964).
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moving up and down the bureaucratic line and into the court process,
a small fine is the result. Obviously, something more effective is needed.8
What is needed is a remedy that is closer at hand and more imme-
diately available to the tenant. Since abating the rent seemed to be the
most effective sanction, laws were passed ° which sought to control
the landlord's abuse of his service obligation by altering in some way
the tenant's rental obligation. Here was a weapon available to the tenant
himself designed to force the landlord to maintain decent housing
conditions.
B. Rent Impairing Remedies,"
The idea behind this new direction was familiar enough. Simply
stated, it was that the tenant's rental obligation was to be reciprocal
with the landlord's service obligation. This same idea, it will be re-
called, was latent in the "constructive eviction with abandonment" doc-
trine and emerged full blown in the constructive eviction without aban-
donment" doctrine. 41
With new laws enacted, the tenant was now free to stay in posses-
sion of the premises. He gained the power, if not to abate fully the
rent, at least to prevent or delay its payment to the landlord.'12 It
was anticipated that this economic pressure would cause the landlord
to perform his service obligation.
38. "We must, therefore, develop new sanctions and remedies in housing code enforce-
ment not only because the old ones no longer work, but also because there has been a
change in the nature of code enforcement itself." Gritbetz & Grad, supra note 29, at 1259.
A new, civil remedy for housing code violations is suggested. Id. at 1281-90.
39. See text accompanying notes 48-63 infra.
40. See generally Comment, supra note 30, at 323-31.
41. "Constructive eviction with adandonment" is much closer to actual eviction since both
are characterized by the tenant's absence from the premises. The difference lies in what
leads to the absence. In the case of actual eviction the landlord physically dispossesses the
tenant. The "constructive" eviction involves something short of this, e.g., harassment, and
now the landlord's gross failure to service the apartment which renders the apartment
untenantable. E.g., Rome v. Johnson, 274 Mass. 444, 174 N.E. 716 (1931) (failure to supply
heat in breach of covenant to do so). What was in fact a failure of service was treated as
breach of the ancient covenant of quiet possession. Since this was so, failure of service now
could affect the rent provided the tenant actually abandoned the premises. The "construc-
tive eviction without abandonment" doctrine attempted to carry the process one step fur-
ther by eliminating the necessity for abandonment in an effort to permit a rental abatement
without requiring a disturbance of the fundamental act of possession by the tenant. If this
had succeeded it would have been clear that a gross failure of service was reciprocal with
the rent. Indeed, with abandonment of the premises no longer necessary, description of the
doctrine as an "eviction" becomes rather strained since this is no longer an important
element. Reciprocity, in turn, emerges as the basic principle.
42. Malek v. Perdina, 58 Misc. 2d 960, 297 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
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These laws took a variety of forms. Some permitted the tenant to
channel the rent to other institutions, e.g., the courts.4 3 Others provided
the tenant with a defense should he stop paying rent and then find
himself faced with summary eviction proceedings." Despite their good
intentions these laws were all subject to the same critical weakness.
This was the simple fact that a tenancy only lasts a limited period of
time. When the tenancy expires, the tenant must leave or the law will
eject him. Should the landlord permit him to remain beyond the lease,
his tenancy continues, but for brief periods, e.g., month to month. He is
now a tenant at the pleasure of the landlord and can be evicted without
reason after notice of termination of the periodic tenancy. The court
called to evict the tenant is concerned with only one question: did the
lease expire? 45 If it did, the tenant is removed.
Consequently, the tenant's bargaining power vis-i-vis the landlord
wanes as the termination of the lease approaches. At this point, even
the legitimate complaint of the luxury apartment tenant is made
obliquely and courteously. Once the lease has ended the tenant is subject
to the landlord's plenary and arbitrary power for the landlord alone
decides whether the tenant may renew the lease. Obviously, the hold-
over tenant is in the poorest possible position to complain or threaten
to withhold the rent.
Unfortunately, the urban ghetto tenant is usually a tenant by suffer-
ance. As a result, the landlord has the power to evict him. The tenant
is well advised, therefore, not to complain. Nagging complaints about
the service, a call to the department of buildings, a discussion of com-
mon complaints with other tenants, invite the landlord's wrath. This
is the retaliatory eviction. Quite simply, it turns out the "trouble-
maker," however legitimate his grievance and desperate his state.
Further, the landlord does not have to give a reason for the eviction.
The risk of retaliatory eviction must be reduced before a tenant can
consider altering his rent payments to force the landlord to improve
basic services. Direct attacks on the retaliatory eviction have been made
in an effort to erase this inequity in the law. However, this effort has
not been notably successful.46
43. E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755(2) (1963).
44. E.g., N.Y. Mult. Dwell Law § 302-a(3) (c) (Supp. 1969).
45. The landlord's reasons for wanting the holdover tenant removed are immaterial.
DeWolfe v. Roberts, 229 Mass. 410, 118 N.E. 885 (1918); Wormood v. Alton Bay Camp
Meeting Ass'n, 87 N.H. 136, 175 A. 233 (1934).
46. There are a few statutes expressly prohibiting retaliatory evictions. E.g., 11. Rev. Stat.
ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1967); M.ich. Comp. Laws § 600.5646(4) (Supp. 1969). A regula-
tion of the Department of Housing and Urban Development dated February 7, 1967, requires
that a tenant in a federally assisted, public housing project who is given notice to vacate must
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The problem, of course, is that the tenant needs a measure of per-
manence if he is to carry the fight to the landlord, and that is precisely
what the holdover tenant does not have. One exception to this exists
in the rent control situation. One of the hidden and seldom acknowledged
advantages of rent control is its permanency of tenure feature. Once
in possession, the tenant stayed there. The landlord's power to evict
on the ground that the lease had run out is sharply circumscribed;
indeed it is virtually nonexistent.47 In this context a retaliatory evic-
tion is no longer possible. Free of this threat, the tenant's position
vis-h-vis the landlord is strengthened. It now becomes possible to talk
intelligently of rent impairing remedies available to the tenant himself.
It is in this light that New York's experience as the only remaining
rent controlled city becomes of general importance. It is also revealing
be told the reasons for the eviction. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969). The
regulation goes a long way toward prohibiting retaliatory eviction, especially when a housing
authority concedes, as it did in the Thorpe case, id. at 282-83, that it may not evict a tenant
for engaging in constitutionally protected activity.
Moreover, the courts seem to be tending toward the prohibition of retaliatory eviction.
See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969)
(Fact that landlord gave month to month tenant notice of termination and sought to evict
the tenant because she had reported sanitary code violations to municipal authority is, under
Washington, D.C. housing and sanitary codes, a defense to the eviction action. The court
indicated that it would be unconstitutional for it to enforce an eviction sought in retaliation
for the exercise of constitutional rights of speech and petition for redress of grievances.);
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dictum); Tarver v.
G.&C. Constr. Co., Civil No. 64-2945 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 1964); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc.
2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S. 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968); Watts v. Lyles, I5 Welfare L.
Bull., Dec., 1968, at 17 (Mich. Cir. Comm'rs Ct. 1968); cf. Lawrence v. Benjamin Realty
Corp., Civil No. 69-3045 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 22, 1969); Prendergast v. Snyder, 64 Cal. 2d
877, 413 P.2d 847, 50 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966); Abstract Investment v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Dist. Ct. 1962) (Landlord sought to evict a holdover because
he was married to a Negro. Held, issuance and enforcement of eviction order would be state
action discriminating on the basis of race, and, therefore, violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment.). But see Hoyt v. La Chance, 14 Welfare L. Bull., Sept., 1968, at 11 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1968) (Enforcement of an eviction order allegedly obtained in retaliation for reporting hous-
ing code violations is not unconstitutional state action when the tenant did not raise the
defense of retaliation in the eviction action) ; Wilkins v. Tebbetts, 216 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968) (Court refused to decide issue of retaliatory eviction because the question
was not properly raised. A dissent would follow the decision in Edwards v. Habib, supra);
Lincoln Square Apartments v. Davis, 58 Misc. 2d 292, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Civ. Ct. 1968) (Con-
stitutional issues may not be considered by New York Civil Court in a summary proceeding to
oust. There are other more appropriate forums for testing the issue of retaliatory eviction) ;
Novick v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 200 Misc. 694, 108 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 279
App. Div. 617, 107 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (2d Dep't 1951).
47. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 8585(1) (1961); New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code § Y51-
6.0 (1963).
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to say the least. How have the newer type remedial statutes fared in
this geographic area?
Section 755 of New York's Real Property Actions and Proceedings
Law4" is designed to give the individual tenant the power to withhold
rent when the landlord fails to perform his service obligation. The law
requires, however, that a serious violation against the landlord be re-
corded by a government bureau before the process commences. When
this occurs, the tenant may stop paying the rent. Should the landlord
later seek to evict the tenant for nonpayment, the tenant can deposit
the rent in court and continue to deposit it until the repairs are made.
At that time, the accumulated rent is turned over to the landlord.
The most striking feature of this new law is its similarity to the
basic ideas present in the older landlord-tenant law. First, the statute
is not designed to compel the landlord to maintain his full service obli-
gation, nor even to comply totally with the housing and health code.
Quite the contrary. Only the gross failure to maintain minimum stan-
dards is singled out for treatment. This, it will be recalled, is the type
of failure that was characterized as "constructive" eviction, and de-
scribed as a situation where conditions were so unbearable that the
tenant was justified in abandoning the premises. "
The second significant point is that it is not merely a gross failure
to provide service which triggers the statute, but one that has been
recorded as such by the municipal authorities. This brings into play the
whole bureaucratic process outlined above in connection with the use
of criminal sanctions. The tenant must initially enlist the aid of the
municipal department concerned, and then support the complaint until
a recorded violation characterized as serious, i.e., sufficient to warrant
a recommendation of prosecution, is made.
A further cruel twist peculiar to the New York law is that the serious
recorded violation must also be serious enough in the estimation of the
court to constitute a constructive eviction and to warrant section 755
treatment. Judges vary, and the tenant's lawyer in New York is never
quite certain how things will go in court, recorded serious violation not-
withstanding.'0 All too frequently the court sweeps it aside, finds for the
48. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755 (Supp. 1969). Similar statutes are Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 239, § 8A (1968); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 1700-01 (Supp. 1969).
49. In New York, effective September 1, 1969, the violation need not amount to a con-
structive eviction. It will be suffident if the condition "is, or is likely to become, dangerous
to life, health or safety." L. 1969, ch. 820 § 1. What that adds to the law is not clear.
50. N. LeBlanc, A Handbook of Landlord-Tenant Procedures and Law, With Forms 13
(2d ed. 1969).
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landlord, and grants a warrant of eviction.5' When this occurs, the now
evicted tenant has only the consolation of knowing that the landlord is
seriously at fault, but not seriously enough. The tenant will not even learn
what constitutes an actual violation because normally the court gives no
reason for its decision. Unfortunately, second guessing the judge is simply
part of the process.
Should the tenant's lawyer be successful and convince the court
that the recorded violation is indeed serious enough to warrant sec-
tion 755 treatment, then the rent is paid into the court and stays there
until repairs are made. As noted previously, when repairs are made, the
accumulated rents are returned to the landlord, less such amounts as the
court may direct to be used to pay for repairs, fuel, electricity and the
like. This, too, is a very old idea which fails to shock only because it is
so familiar. What the law is stressing is the ancient idea that the landlord
has a right to the full rent so long as the tenant is actually in possession.
The full rent is the quid pro quo for possession, and so long as possession
is retained by the tenant, the full rent is due and payable.
What startles the reasonably neutral observer is the treatment of
the tenant. The landlord has seriously failed to fulfill his obligation.
This has resulted in premises so seriously below standards as to war-
rant intervention by municipal authorities and perhaps, criminal pros-
ecution. The conditions have persisted for a long time, certainly through
the long delays incident to departmental inspection, formal recordation,
eviction proceedings, and final court action. In the meantime, the tenant
remains in the miserable apartment, which admittedly is a hazard to
life and health. Yet, when the landlord finally decides to repair, he
regains a right to all the accumulated rent. What of the real losses
the tenant has suffered in the interim? Human misery aside, the apart-
ment itself failed to be minimally tenantable for significant periods of
time. However, the full rent, even for those periods, still accrued to
the landlord. This result can only be characterized as preposterous.
It is as if a leased car turned out to be defective in its heating,
lighting, gas and electrical systems. It is a misery to the driver, a hazard
to the rest of us, and cause for the criminal prosecution of the lessor.
Yet, the entire rental payment would remain due. At best, rental
payments could be paid over into court and returned in full to the
leasing company if and when repairs were ultimately made. A statute
built on these lines is simply shocking in its callous disregard for basic
justice. The reason is historic. The rent is the ancient price for posses-
sion and the tenant had possession. Thus, the newer law repeats the
51. Comment, supra note 30, at 324 n.96. But see Malek v. Perdina, 58 Misc. 2d 960, 297
N.Y.S.2d 14 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
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inherited formula of the older landlord-tenant law. However that for-
mula is incorrect. When the rent is paid a good deal more is expected
than mere possession. Everyone knows that. That courts should repeat
and laws incorporate the old bromide is a monument to either ignorance,
complacency or callousness.
Rental abatement for the landlord's failure to supply services, as
distinguished from merely withholding and subsequently depositing the
rent into court, is also available in New York, through section 302A of
the Multiple Dwelling Law." A study of this law is instructive. Again,
a serious recorded violation is required to get the law into operation.
Six months after the landlord has been notified of the recordation, the
section 302A abatement takes effect.53 What this means is that six
months after notification the tenant can stop paying rent and, when a
nonpayment proceeding is commenced, deposit the accumulated rent into
court," and seek a section 302A abatement. If he succeeds in obtaining
the abatement he can retain the rent and need pay no further rent until
repairs are made.5
The startling thing is that we have reached such a point in the
radical inequality between landlord and tenant that this presents itself
as remedial legislation. Observe that we are talking about a gross abuse
of service by the landlord which constitutes a serious violation of the
housing or health code. The tenant must suffer this violation for a
full six months before the law accords him the abatement remedy. He
is held to the full rent during that period. In addition, the landlord
can defeat section 302A by singling out the critical violation, repairing
it, and leaving everything else in the same condition. If the tenant loses
in his action, he loses not only the case but also can be ordered to pay
$100 in court costs56 plus the rent! This results notwithstanding the
fact that the apartment is definitely substandard and the landlord is in
default on many points.
The remedies geared to governmental intervention to reduce the rent
52. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302-a (Supp. 1969).
53. Id. at § 302-a(3) (a). See Ten West 28th St. Realty Corp. v. Moerdler, 52 Misc. 2d
109, 275 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
54. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302-a(3)(c) (Supp. 1969).
55. Id.
56. The tenant can be required to pay costs of up to $100 only when he raLs the
defense frivolously, i.e., when he claims a rent impairing violation of at least six months
duration when there is not one; when the tenant caused the violation and when he refused
the landlord entry to his premises to repair the violation. If the tenant loses because, though
there is a rent impairing violation on record, the landlord has repaired it, the tenant cannot
be made to pay costs of $100. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302-a(3)(e) (Supp. 1969).
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have been more successful. Thus, under New York's Spiegel Law,61
the Department of Welfare can cut off rental payments where the tenant
is on welfare and there are serious recorded violations, i.e., the apart-
ment is "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health."18 In-
finitely more sophisticated, although rarely recognized for its radical
theoretical importance, is the power of the New York Rent and Rehabili-
tation Administration to decrease the permissible rent in a rent controlled
dwelling by way of adjustment for the decline in services. 9 This remedy,
although dependent on rent control, is extremely enlightened.
First, the rent control law is not only geared to remedying the land-
lord's flagrant failure to supply services. In theory, at least, it provides
a possible remedy for any substantial failure of services. Second, it
takes as a first principal that the rent is made up of something more
than- merely the transfer of possession. Rent is conceived rather as a
package sum which contains compensation for both possession and the
basic services that give possession its real value. Third, the law operates
on the premise that the covenant to pay the rent is indeed reciprocal
with the landlord's obligation to render service. Theoretically, as one
varies so should the other.
All of these ideas are as novel as they are fair. The unfortunate
fact is that the ideas required the context of rent control to attain
articulation in the law. This confines them to a single city in the na-
tion. The wonder is that such insights have not found more universal
application in one form or another elsewhere.
A different approach to the problem is found in Article 7-A of the
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.0° This is New York's Rent
Strike Law. It is an affirmative remedy accorded to one third of the
residents of multi-family dwellings." The statute permits them to go
to court, deposit the rent, and get an administrator appointed to run
the building and to make the repairs. 2
57. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 143-b (1966). A similar statute is Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 23,
§ 11-23 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
58. N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 143-b(2) (1966).
59. New York City, N.Y., Admin. Code Y51-5.0(h) (Supp. 1969); 1 City of New York,
Rules and Regulations of New York City Agencies § 34.2 (1967).
60. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law §§ 769-782 (Supp. 1969). Massachusetts has a similar
law, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111, § 127F (1967). Other statutes permit tenants to cause repairs
to be made and to deduct the cost from the rent: Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1941-42 (West 1954);
La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2692-94 (West 1952); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann, §§ 42-201 to 02
(1947) ; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 47-16-12 to 13 (1960); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 41, §§ 31-32
(1954); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 43-32-9 (1967).
61. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 770 (Supp. 1969).
62. Id. at §§ 776(b), 778(1).
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This brief summary of Article 7-A underplays the awesome com-
plexity involved in organizing the tenants, presenting the case, and
administering the building.6 The process discourages all but the hardiest
ghetto lawyer, and more often than not, even he will refuse to go the
7-A route.
Yet, in New York, the 7-A proceeding is among the first things the
ghetto lawyer considers after he has noted the obvious ones of simply
relocating the family, getting a rent reduction from the rent control
board or stopping the rent via the Speigal Law for the welfare client.
The tragedy is that these are all the remedies available to the tenant.
Landlord-tenant law, not only in New York but also across the nation,
as it regulates the private obligations between the landlord and the
tenant comes to very little. At best, the law justifies the tenant in mov-
ing out in horrendous situations without fear of being later charged
with a demand for further rent. However, it offers very few practical ways
for the tenant to hold the landlord to minimum standards of housing de-
cency. Yet, all admit that the tenant is utterly dependent on the land-
lord's affirmative activity in the multi-family dwelling unit. The housing
and health codes provide high hopes and promises, but little else. It
is comforting to know that the landlord can be threatened by the law,
but the law is exceedingly cumbersome and carries in this area a painless
sting. Rent impairing remedies are noted, but even in a jurisdiction like
New York where rent control blocks the retaliatory eviction and as-
sures the tenant a measure of permanence, they are insignificant.
The urban ghetto tenant is the leper in our midst. Even the law pur-
porting to remedy his more desperate needs, only mocks him with a
promise that it consistently fails to deliver. There he sits, and even the
sophisticated urban lawyer is largely powerless to help him. Small wonder
that rumblings of violence are heard in the ghettos of the nation and that
our best young minds raise angry questions we are hard put to answer
honestly.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTUE
64
Little is accomplished by complaining about the past or raging about
the present, unless one is equally concerned about the future. Indeed,
the future is where the really critical problem situates itself. Faced with
an ancient body of law long unsuited to reform, the temptation is to
accept its injustices. Unfortunately, this seems to be the pattern of
the present. This passivity comes at a high price, not only in terms of
human misery but also in terms of our own acceptance of powerless-
63. See generally N. LeBlanc, supra note 50, at 30-31.
64. See also Gribetz and Grad, supra note 29, at 1281-90; Levi, supra note 34, at 279-85.
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ness before injustice. What is more dangerous still, we lose our sensi-
tivity to justice with all that that implies. We have grown so complacent
before the legal inadequacies of the landlord-tenant law that it now
seems normal enough, even fair. Unfortunately, this sort of life has the
stagnant smell of death.
At the other extreme is an attitude of intense frustration which wouldIsweep both the past and the present aside and replace them with utopian
legislative schemes. A code similar to the recent Uniform Commercial
Code, now operative throughout the commercial world, is no doubt
possible. Indeed, it is desirable. But codes of this magnitude and com-
plexity do not spring out of the head full blown. They take time and
necessitate long periods of ferment and maturation. They require as
well the intense concern of many, and a broad based recognition of
the need for change. In time, the law of landlord-tenant may come upon
these resources. At present, it does not have them in any great abun-
dance. Very little is happening in the law of landlord-tenant.05 Quite
literally this body of law is static, and the few concerned, far from
being buoyed up by hope, are oppressed by the apparent futility of
efforts at reform.
If our legal house is to be set in order, the most effective way to do
it is gradually, on a case by case basis. This is the traditional approach
of the common law. It is eminently manageable in this area. Three
things are needed if the common law method is to be effectual. First,
there must be an intense realization of the present system's injustice;
second, a measure of confidence in the courts as a vehicle of reform in
this area; and third, some basic idea of the lines along which develop-
ment within the traditional framework is possible. It is the last point
which requires some elaboration.
Surprisingly, landlord-tenant law, for all its present horrors, remains
sufficiently malleable to serve the purposes of reform. Indeed, one sus-
pects the real trouble in the past has been a decided lack of legal
acumen, imagination and courage in shaping old rules to serve present
needs.
The safest method of developing guidelines in this area is to build
on the obvious inadequacies of the present system. To this end, five
suggestions are offered as a fundamental but small beginning in this
important work.
First: It should be frankly recognized that the rent is not simply
65. One hopeful sign is the recent Landlord-Tenant code offered by the American Bar
Foundation as a law reform proposal and as a method of advancing discussion of the
legal aspects of landlord-tenant problems. ABF Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code
(Tent. Draft 1969).
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a quid pro quo for possession. No one actually believes that it is, and
for the law to insist that it is can only be described as irresponsible.
Possession is but part of what one pays for when one pays the rent.
What gives possession value is a complex system of supporting services
which should be expressly recognized by the law."0 When you rent an
apartment, you are dealing with the landlord in terms of living space
to be sure, but you are also dealing with him in terms of heat, light,
sanitation, ingress and egress, and many other things."
The realization will come as a surprise to some that this fundamental
point is rather traditional. We have already considered this very point
in the law of landlord-tenant and accepted its basic wisdom. Indeed,
it was felt to be self-evident. More surprising still, the point was de-
veloped not in response to tenant demands but rather to those of the
landlords themselves."
This was the national experience with rent control. Here the sub-
ject was rent and it was necessary to know realistically the concept's
components if payment levels were to be set or adjusted intelligently.
It certainly required no elaboration to prove that there was more to
the rent than the quiet possession of the apartment space. 0
66. In Chicago Housing Authority v. Bild, 346 Ill. App. 272, 104 N.E.2d 666 (19S2),
it was contended that a surcharge for the use of an extraordinary amount of electric power
could not be considered "rent" for the purpose of an action to dispossess for nonpayment
of rent. The court disagreed and held for the landlord. It stated: "(D]efendant urges that
the term 'rent' must be limited to the profit out of the lands and tenements and can-
not include compensation for such services as electricity furnished the tenant, even though
the parties by their agreement expressly include the furnishing of such services as a part
of the consideration for the rent fixed in the lease. This contention ignores the present day
conditions in large cities where multiple dwelling buildings are not only common but
necessary to meet the requirement of housing a great number of people in a small area.
Electricity, gas and water are as essential to the proper enjoyment of the use of these
dwelling places'as light and air. No reason of public policy prohibits the parties from in-
cluding the furnishing of this service as part consideration of the fixed monthly rental
agreed upon, and to provide, as additional rental, for payment for additional or extraor-
dinary electricity, gas or water." Id. at 275, 104 N.E.2d at 667.
67. Landlords acknowledge this fact prosaically in their advertisements. These typically
state that services such as a doorman, gas, electricity, air-conditioning and a television
security system are included in the rent. E.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1969, at 69, cols. 4-9.
68. See, e.g., cases cited in note 69 infra.
69. This point is not confined to the rent control situation. Landlords have successfully
argued that rent is payment for more than the delivery of possession in instances where
they have been asserting a right to distress, or to a lien, or even the right to evict. Thus,
the entire payment promised by the tenant was "rent" for the above purposes though the
payment was not merely for possession of land but also for the use of chattels on the
land. See generally Stein v. Stely, 32 S.W. 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) (furniture in a
rented room); for gas, see generally Fernwood Masonic Hall Ass'n v. Jones, 102 Pa. 307
(1883); for water, see generally Woolsey v. Abbet, 65 N.J.L. 253, 48 A. 949 (Ct. Err & App.
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It is high time that the courts shaped the law to conform to this
common understanding. Not to do so makes of the law a sort of "Alice-
in-Wonderland" world.
Second: The idea that covenants in a lease are not reciprocal is an
ancient legal axiom whose repetition serves little purpose, and does very
great harm. Initially, the idea had theoretical justification to commend it
but it is doubtful that even its most ardent present admirer could defend
it rationally on grounds other than a predeliction for the landlord's
cause.70 Moreover, it is a sport in the law inconsistent with the more
rational recognition in other areas of the law that reciprocity of promises
and performances is an apparent first principle.1
The absence of reciprocity, therefore, is really an eccentricity of the
law of landlord-tenant. The unhappy thing is that this particular ec-
centricity results in patent legal injustices readily translatable into
terms of human misery and suffering. It should be quietly put to rest.
To do so does not require so radical a departure from the past as one
might at first imagine.
The "constructive" eviction is an established part of the law of
landlord-tenant. Its use to cover the situation where the landlord has
seriously failed to maintain the premises is also familiar law. What this
means in terms of theory is that under the guise of the traditional,
a new idea has already been accepted. There is even now reciprocity
1900) ; for electricity, see generally 140 West 69th St. Corp. v. Simis, 186 Misc. 342, 61 N.Y.S.2d
548 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1945); Chicago Housing Authority v. Bild, 346 Ill. App. 272, 104
N.E.2d 666 (1952); and for repairs made by the landlord, see generally Knepper v. Roth-
baum, 104 Misc. 554, 172 N.Y.S. 109 (App. T. 1918). On what payments constitute rent,
see generally 2 American Law of Property § 9A3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
70. On dependency of covenants in a lease, see Schoshinski, supra note 22, at 534-37.
71. "[I]t is idle to speculate whether the land or the promise is the principal element
of a lease of an apartment with a promise to furnish heat from a central heating plant or
of a lease of space in a modem business building with a promise not to lease other parts
of the building to an operator of a competing business. The bargain is for both. If the
warp is conveyance, the woof is contract and neither alone makes a whole cloth." 1 Amer-
ican Law of Property § 3.11, at 203 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952). The obvious indication Is
that a lease should be governed by contract law when justice requires; Inter alla, the
covenant for rent and the landlord's 'service and repair covenants should be viewed as
mutually dependent. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132
P.2d 457 (1942). It has been held that the duty to pay rent is dependent upon several
of the landlord's covenants. See University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914) ;
Stiftner v. Hartman, 225 Mich. 101, 195 N.W. 673 (1923). In Pines v. Persslon, 14 Wls. 2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) it was held that the rent was dependent upon the landlord's
covenant of habitability. The doctrine of constructive eviction recognizes the dependency. A
constructive eviction may be claimed because of the landlord's failure, in breach of contract
or statute, to maintain the premises and provide essential services. See 1 American Law of
Property § 3.51, at 282 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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between the landlord's service obligation and the tenant's rent obliga-
tion.
The real problem is that this reciprocity surfaces only when the
landlord's failure is horrendous and becomes operative only when the
tenant abandons the premises. It is only then that the failure consti-
tutes a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. It takes no great
legal acumen to see that with the principle of reciprocity established
it is an easy step to its extension. Now it is merely a matter of degree
to move from the extreme failure to supply services, to the very
serious, to the substantial coupled with the elimination of the require-
ment of abandonment. It can be done on a step by step basis, and the
court can easily draw the line where it sees the need.
If further precedent for reciprocity is felt to be necessary, that too
is at hand with the older rent control regulations. - Granted, this type
of legislation is presently operative in only one city, New York, but
its basic insight is of more universal value. The idea is that the rent
should vary with the service. It helped the landlord raise the rental
payment levels, it worked against him where service was curtailed.
Significantly, the landlord has retained the power to raise the rental
level. Where controls are imposed, as in New York, he is quick to
insist on the fact that rent levels must reflect service costs. Yet, he
vigorously resists the same idea when advanced by the tenant who
complains of inadequate services and asserts that this should be re-
flected in rent payments.
If it is felt that a frank adoption of the idea that covenants in the
lease are reciprocal Would be too unsettling, there are easy compromises
at hand. One was suggested above. Thus, the landlord's failure to pro-
vide service can be characterized as tantamount to a breach of the
covenant of quiet possession. The breach can affect the rent. The
covenant of quiet possession can, in turn, be shaped case by case to fit
contemporary needs, with breaches ranging from the horrendous, as
we have at present with the typical constructive eviction situation, down
to the substantial.
Another possibility is to think of the rent as a package containing
payment components designed to cover first possession of the apart-
ment space and then the service obligation. This is simply the fact
anyway. With this established, it is possible to retain the old law un-
changed as to the component of the rent that is attributable to the
apartment space. This would establish an absolute rent floor for the
landlord. What we now treat as rent, i.e., the whole rent, would be
contracted to cover only a part of the present rent. The remainder could
72. 1 City of New York, Rules and Regulations of New York City Agencies, §§ 22,
34.2 (1967).
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then be treated as fully reciprocal with the service obligation. One of
the more startling notes in the history of landlord-tenant law is that
something like this was not developed when the ancient two level,
no reciprocity of covenants system was established.
Third: The landlord's service obligation should be faced squarely
and consciously, and developed on a case by case basis. Frequently,
there are contractual provisions in leases. But at present, the prime
source of the landlord's service obligation is found in statutes and
housing and health codes. This is acceptable, but what we are doing
here should be kept clearly in focus. We are imposing on the landlord
civic obligations for breach of which the tenant has no remedy, and
which are enforceable normally only through the intermediation of
municipal authorities." This legislation says nothing about the standards
of minimum quality which the landlord should owe to the tenant him-
self.
What the law has failed to recognize is that the modern landlord
is in the business of leasing space, just as the merchant is in the
business of selling goods. Like everyone else in the marketplace he
too should be held to standards of minimum quality. The courts, there-
fore, should consciously develop warranty standards in this area.
The landlord is not in the business of leasing space, period, but in
the business of leasing habitable space, and that rather obvious point
should be clearly seen and consciously enforced by the courts. Where
space is leased for living purposes there should be a warranty of
habitability.74
The warranty's contents should be developed by the court again
through case law, guided by the health and housing codes.73 With
73. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Short, 203 Misc. 979, 120 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct.
1953), aff'd mem. on other grounds, 283 App. Div. 779, 129 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1st Dep't 1954).
74. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961) (Landlord impliedly
warrants that a furnished dwelling is habitable at the beginning of the term. To follow
the common law rule of no implied warranty of fitness would be inconsistent with current
legislative policy, embodied in housing and health codes, imposing quality standards on
property owners). See 1 American Law of Property § 3.45, at 267-69 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) ;
cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Humber v. Morton,
426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (Builder-vendor of new home impliedly warrants to vendee
that the house is suitable for human habitation.). See also Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,
237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968) (The lease of premises is void and the landlord
cannot recover rent when the premises contain housing code violations known to the land-
lord when the tenant entered into the lease agreement.); Silamar Estates, Inc. v. Blen,
165 Misc. 239, 2 N.Y.S.2d 512 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1937); N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 302
(1946) (providing that neither rent nor possession for nonpayment may be recovered by the
landlord of premises within a multiple dwelling when no certificate of occupancy has been
issued).
75. See generally Schoshinski, supra note 22, at 523-28.
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time and experience, hopefully more specific concepts such as "reason-
able fitness for ordinary habitation," "fair average service," "adequacy
of ingress and egress," etc. will emerge.
Precedents for such a development are at hand in abundance. In-
deed, it is worth noting that the vast law of warranty liability in the
commercial law field was and remains in the final analysis the work
of concerned lawyers and judges. They developed it over the centuries
through case law for the simple and humane reason that ordinary de-
cency and justice required them to do so. The need is no less intense
today in the landlord-tenant field. The real mystery is that so little is
being done.
Fourth: The tenant's remedies for the landlord's failure to provide
services need reshaping. The place to start is with the rent. Clearly,
rent reduction or abatement can be an effective remedy. It is certainly
close at hand. Once it is established that there is some degree of rec-
iprocity between the landlord's service obligation and the tenant's rent
obligation the way will be open for the development of a common law
remedy sanctioning rent impairment by the tenant himself. This is a
natural consequence that follows from the establishment of the recip-
rocity point. Viewed in this light, rent impairment is quite similar to
the longstanding right of the buyer to withhold final payment of the
price when it is clear that the merchandise or the service is defective.7 0
This type of right is ancient, sensible and no more difficult to manage
in the landlord-tenant field than it is in the marketplace. It is certainly
long overdue and is the pattern along which every effort at remedial
legislation in the field has been shaped.
The real danger is that over concentration on the rent tends to blind
the observer to other elements in the problem that are of equal impor-
tance. Since the rent is what the tenant pays for the leased premises,
i.e., the habitable space, it is analogous to the price one pays for any item
of merchandise purchased on the market. There is a vast difference,
however, between the price one pays for merchandise and the possible
monetary damages the seller of the merchandise may be called upon
to pay. For example, an inexpensive purchase of foodstuffs can result
in very serious liability where the food proves defective and the buyer
suffers physical injury as a result. The damages here not only eclipse
the small cost of the product but also cut deeply and painfully into
the seller's substance.
76. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-717. See also Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-711,
2-609 which state that where the buyer has reasonable grounds for insecurity regarding
the seller's performance he can withhold the purchase price if the seller refuses to give
adequate assurances of performance.
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There is no logical or legal correlation between the price and damages
for breach of contract or warranty.77 The former is what creates the
contract. The latter is the law's attempt to assure performance, complete
and to the letter. Thus, the buyer's recovery for a breach is not limited
to the price paid for the commodity, but reaches to all that is neces-
sary to put him in as good a position as he would have been if the
seller had performed properly. 8 It is the risk of being held to this
duty which makes nonperformance or defective performance so serious
a risk. It keeps the seller honest. This point is basic not only to the
law of contract, sales, and every other branch of law, but also is funda-
mental to the law of damages itself.
Consequently, when the landlord fails in his service obligations he
exposes himself to the possibility of both rent impairment and liability
for damages. His service failure, therefore, carries with it the risk of
liability for the food that spoils in the refrigerator and the furniture
that is ruined by leakage. Also costs incident to a tenant's efforts to
warm a cold apartment, even to the point of temporarily moving his
family into heated quarters, are merely damages consequential to the
landlord's breach for which he ought to be liable.
Radical as this may seem, it is simply the present law of landlord-
tenant. While the two level system of landlord-tenant relationships was
developing, the understanding was that there were to be remedies on
both levels. The service function situated itself on level two and normally
one sued for the damages that flowed from the breach. This was
largely abandoned as an effective weapon, no doubt because it was im-
practical to sue for damages alone while the rental obligation remained.
This remedy should be revived.
Clearly, if the landlord is held to warranty liability, and if a common
law remedy of rent impairment is recognized, the tenant's power to
sue also for damages in order to be made whole for interim losses be-
comes enormously important. Its availability will have a profound and
healthy effect on landlord-tenant relationships. With these remedies
available to the tenant, a landlord is well advised to assure the ade-
quacy of his own performances. Clearly, in most cases, it will be far
safer and cheaper to maintain at least minimum heat and basic services.
Another easily manageable approach to the same problem would be
for the court to read the existing provisions of the building and health
codes into the lease as implied covenants and then to permit the tenant
damages for their breach.
Fifth: Finally, landlord-tenant law needs a strong infusion of the
77. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
78. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715; compare Uniform Commercial Code § 2-709
(the price actions) with Uniform Commercial Code § 2-714 (the breach of warranty action).
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equitable ideas which are commonplace in other areas of the law. Most
important is the requirement of "good faith." The courts should con-
sciously insist that the exercise of every right and the performance of
every obligation incident to the landlord-tenant relationship carry with
it the obligation of "good faith." This should mean not only basic
fairness but also the observance of commercially reasonable standards
of conduct. For example, a retaliatory eviction should not be tolerated.70
Not because the landlord is not within his rights in evicting the holdover
tenant, but because the law should not assist the landlord where the
landlord himself clearly is not acting in good faith. For the court to do
otherwise makes it an active member of a vindictive conspiracy.80
Predictably, any effort to strengthen the tenant's position will be
matched by efforts fully as vigorous and probably more sophisticated
to undo the advances made. It is also predictable that the chief instru-
ment that the landlord will use to maintain his position will be the
lease itself. It is enormously important, therefore, that the court refuse
to strictly enforce inequitable clauses. A wide range of legal concepts
stand ready to assist the court, not to intimidate the landlord but to
insure that a decent standard of conduct is required of the contracting
parties. To this end, the law's long tradition of dealing with waivers, dis-
claimers and self-serving limitations is enormously important, as is the
developing doctrine of unconscionability, s' and judicial skepticism of the
contract of adhesion.
Also, there is the problem of the landlord or the tenant who manifests
at an early date that he is definitely not going to perform or that it is
highly unlikely that he will perform. To cope with this problem, the
law has developed the doctrine of anticipatory breach. The law also
imposed the right to assurances of performance in some situations which
can and should be applied to landlord-tenant relationships.2
79. See generally Schosbinski, supra note 22, at 541-52.
80. The use of equitable notions such as "good faith" to suppress the retaliatory eviction
is offered by way of illustration. It is not meant to suggest that there are not other legal
approaches to the solution of the same problem, eg., the constitutional challenges. See
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schoshinaki, supra note 22, at
543-44.
81. For a statutory formulation of this basic idea see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302.
See also King, New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial. Code: Ethics, Title and
Good Faith Purchase, 11 St. Louis U. L.J. 15, 16-22 (1966); Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1967); Note, Uncon-
scionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401 (1961);
Note, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-302, 45
Va. L. Rev. 583 (1959); 58 Dick. LJ. 161 (1954).
82. See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-609, 2-610, 2-611 for the operation of these
ideas in the marketing of goods.
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VI. CONCLUSION
One final problem remains. It inevitably arises in any consideration
of reform. This is the money problem. Let it be frankly admitted that
any real and meaningful effort, however modest, to place the law of
landlord-tenant on a sounder footing carries with it obvious monetary
consequences. If the landlord is to be effectively compelled to maintain
standards of decency in housing, it will surely cost more to run the
multi-family unit than it does now. That is one rather obvious point.
Another is that you can only push a landlord so far. There is always his
ultimate weapon, to simply knock the building down and use the space
for other purposes. If that is not feasible, abandonment of the building
remains. These are real dangers and honesty compels an admission of
their existence. Whether this would actually happen, the degree to
which it would happen, with what frequency, and with what options
available to remedy the situation should it occur, are open questions.
The American businessman has an uncanny ability to operate, when
necessary, in a really tight market. He certainly does not invite the op-
portunity, but somehow he survives and gets the job done. For example,
a vigorous ghetto market flourishes, notwithstanding a body of quite
modem commercial law. It does so under the surveillance of a vast and
complex system of consumer protection legislation. Even assuming that
there is a very real risk incident to holding the marginal landlord to
standards of basic fairness, does it make sense to parlay a dreadful
housing situation into a dreadful body of law? A set of legal rules which
are admittedly unjust, not only closes off the possibility of even gradual
reform and adjustment, but also takes a hidden toll of everyone involved.
The law of landlord-tenant is the law to most low income dwellers and it
instructs them everyday on the value society places on basic fairness and
the social classes it prefers.
No less affected is the court itself. It maintains its dignity in this
area only by applying the received law without reflecting too deeply
on its basic fairness or its net effect in terms of human suffering.
The sad thing is that bases for reform lie within the law itself. To
reform the law does not require prodigious skills and energy. It does
require a genuine concern for the citizens that stand before the bench
and an active commitment to the law's need to be manifestly just.
Moreover, one must be willing to tackle the confusion and uncertainty
that goes with moving the law, however gradually, along newer and
more wholesome lines.
